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Abstract
In this article we describe recent work done in building a university-wide grid at the University of
Cambridge based on the Condor middleware [1].  Once the issues of stakeholder concerns (e.g.
security policies) and technical problems (e.g. firewalls and private IP addresses) have been taken
into account, a solution based on two separate Condor environments was decided on.  The first of
these is a single large pool administered centrally by the University Computing Service (UCS) and
the second a federated service of flocked Condor pools belonging to various departments and run
over a Virtual Private Network (VPN).  We report on the current status of this ongoing work.
1. Introduction
The concept of building a university-wide grid
whose  purpose  is  to  harness  as  many  idle
computational resources as possible is not new.
Indeed, this has already been achieved using the
Condor  middleware  [1]  at  University  College
London (UCL) as part of the eMinerals project
[2].  Condor is a High Throughput Computing
(HTC) resource and job management software
designed  to  harness  idle  CPU  cycles  from  a
heterogeneous  pool  of  computers.   The
approach and solution employed in the current
instance are, however, markedly different from
that used at UCL.  This is mainly due to more
complex stakeholder issues as well as to greater
technological  obstacles,  which  has  led  us  to
implement  two  distinct,  non-interacting
environments.  We use the term environment to
mean a number of flocked Condor pools (or a
single  Condor  pool)  that  do  not  interact  with
any other Condor pools in the University.  The
aim  is  to  integrate  these  environments  into  a
single resource when the middleware reaches a
sufficient  level  of  functionality  and  maturity
such that it is able to address all stakeholders’
requirements
The  available  resources  consist  of  a  wide
range of platforms, running different operating
systems, and owned by a multitude of different
bodies.   These  bodies  consist  of  individual
research  groups,  entire  Departments  or
Colleges, and the central University Computing
Service  (UCS).   To  complicate  matters,  some
(but  not  all)  of  these  resources  are  behind
firewalls.   Whereas  this  obstacle  may  be
circumvented  through  the  addition  of
appropriate exceptions in a firewall ruleset (and
indeed,  Condor  has  improved  in  the  way  it
allows the requisite port ranges to be defined),
this  approach  is  unattractive  from  an
administrative  point  of  view since  all  firewall
rules  would  have  to  be  updated  every  time  a
machine joins or leaves the environment.  This
problem may  be  mitigated  to  some extent  by
only allowing jobs to be submitted from a small
number  of  hosts,  though  this  restricts  current
usage policy in some departments that allow all
machines  participating  in  a  Condor  pool  to
submit  to  that  pool.   As  an  additional
complication,  many  of  these  machines  have
private  IP  addresses  rendering  difficult  their
participation in a Condor environment spanning
all of the above resources. 
Apart  from  the  technological  problems
mentioned above, we also had to contend with
the  security  requirements  of  the  different
stakeholders,  as  not  all  stakeholders  have  the
same  requirements.   For  example,  the  UCS
wished to employ some form of “strong” host-
based  authentication,  e.g.  using  X.509
certificates  or  Kerberos  authentication,  for  all
participating  machines,  which  was  not
necessarily compatible with the security model
of other interested parties.  Also since the UCS
machines  under  discussion  would  be  running
Linux  when  participating  in  a  Condor
environment,  such  a  requirement  also
automatically  precludes  any  machines  running
the Windows OS from being used since Condor
does  not  currently  offer  any  “strong”
authentication method across all the platforms it
supports (and in particular, across the Windows
and Linux platforms).  Consideration of points
such as these led us to a solution that consists of
two separate, non-interacting, environments.
Despite  this  division  of  the  available
resources  into  two  non-interacting
environments, a key design goal for CamGrid is
that  this  division  should  be  invisible  to  end-
users, i.e. that the end-user should not have to
make  a  conscious  decision  about  which
environment their job should run in (unless they
wish  to  be  exposed  to  this level  of  choice  or
their  requirements  can  only  be  satisfied  by
machines  in  one  particular  environment).
Provisional  plans  for  achieving  this  goal  are
discussed in Section 3.1.
It must be borne in mind that the university-
wide grid is still being constructed and so many
of  the  details  given  here  may  change  in  due
course.
2. The Two Environments
2.1 Environment 1
The  first  of  these  environments  comprises  a
single  pool  whose  execute  nodes  are  drawn
from  machines  owned  and  managed  by  the
UCS,  and  which  belong  to  the  Personal
Workstation  Facility  (PWF).   The  PWF  is  a
collection  of  PCs  and  Apple  Macintosh
computers that are centrally managed and have
been set up to present a consistent environment
to  ordinary  users.   A  series  of  images  –
snapshots of the operating system (OS) made at
a particular moment in time – are installed on
these  machines  periodically  throughout  the
year, and mechanisms are in place to update the
machines  with  patches,  updates,  virus
definitions for their anti-virus software, etc. as
necessary.   These  machines  are  not  operating
behind a firewall, and all have globally visible
IP addresses.
The PCs that  comprise the PWF are either
dual  boot  Windows/Linux  machines  or  else
only  run  the  Windows  OS.   At  the  time  of
writing the image about to be deployed on the
PWF PCs will  upgrade  them to run  Windows
XP and SuSE Linux 9.0, or Windows XP only,
as appropriate.  The Linux installation on PWF
PCs is known as PWF Linux and the Windows
installation  on  PWF  PCs  is  known  as  PWF
Windows.   The  Apple  Macintosh  computers
that  are  part  of  the  PWF are  known as  PWF
Macs and currently run Mac OS X v10.2 – this
is about to be upgraded to Mac OS X v10.3.
Eventually  it  is  planned  that  all  machines
that  are  part  of  the  central  UCS-owned  PWF
will  be  Condor  execute  nodes  in  this
environment  (Environment  1).   However,  a
phased implementation has been adopted which
has begun with PWF Linux, and will probably
then  incorporate  the  PWF  Macs  and  finally
PWF Windows.
The standard setup for a PC which has both
PWF Windows and PWF Linux installed is for
the PC to boot into Windows by default, and to
reboot to Windows if no user is logged in and
the machine is left idle in Linux.  It is proposed
that this behaviour will be changed so that when
the PWF machines in a particular area are not in
use  (e.g.  overnight)  they  will  (re)boot  into
Linux and remain there, unless a user wishes to
use them under Windows, until those machines
are likely to be again in demand (e.g. the next
morning).  The details of this change of policy
are still being negotiated, but it seems likely that
this will leave most of those PCs which support
PWF Linux  booted  into  Linux  for  at  least  8
hours or so a day.
So  Environment  1  will  initially  consist  of
about 400 PWF Linux machines (in this initial
phase,  when  machines  are  not  running  PWF
Linux  they  will  not  run  any  of  the  Condor
daemons  and  so  will  not  take  part  in
Environment 1).   This means that most of the
machines  in  this  Environment  will  only  be
available for Condor jobs during those periods
when  the  PWF  receives  very  little  use  –
overnight during the University term, probably
for longer (perhaps even all the time for some
collections of PWF machines) outside of term.
Users who wish to submit Condor jobs to this
Environment will need to take this into account
when deciding whether it is worth running their
jobs  in  this  Environment.   This  Environment
will clearly favour jobs with shorter execution
times and jobs that can checkpoint.
There  will  be  a  single  dedicated  central
manager,  which  may  also  act  as  Kerberos
domain  controller  for  the  machines  in  this
Condor pool, and a small number of submission
nodes  (initially  one),  with  1TB  of  attached
short-term  disk  storage.   Access  to  the
submission nodes is via the SSH protocol.  No
checkpoint  server  will  be  provided.   (This
model is similar to the UCL model described in
[2], though in that model the central manager is
also the submission node, and the execute nodes
run almost exclusively under Windows.)
All daemon-daemon communication in this
environment is authenticated via Kerberos, but
Condor  does  not  perform  any  user
authentication.  Condor’s network transmissions
will  not  be  encrypted.   Access to this  pool  is
administered  by  the  UCS,  but  it  is  currently
envisaged that any user entitled to use the PWF
will be entitled to run jobs in this Condor pool –
indeed, the user authentication performed by the
SSH  server  on  the  submission  node(s)  may
authenticate  via  the  same  service  which
authenticates  normal  interactive  logins  to  the
PWF.
Thus the user authentication is performed at
the  ‘point  of  entry’  to  the  pool  (i.e.  the
submission  node),  and  not  thereafter.   All
communication  between  the  Condor  daemons,
i.e. communication using Condor’s protocols to
any  machine  in  the  Condor  pool,  is
authenticated  using  a  “strong”  authentication
method,  so  that  it  should  not  be  possible  for
either an unauthenticated user to submit a job,
or for a job to be submitted from a machine that
has  not  been  officially  designated  as  a
submission node.
By providing a large amount (1 TB in total)
of short-term file storage, most users’ jobs will
not need to access any external file storage as
there  should  be  sufficient  short-term  storage
attached  to  the  submission  node  for  any  files
required by the job.  Condor can then transfer
these  to  the  execute  node  if  necessary.
Similarly,  there should be sufficient  space for
the  output,  including  any  checkpoint  files,  of
the  most  users’  jobs.   A policy  regarding  the
length of time that users’ files can be stored on
this short-term file storage is still to be decided.
Initially  the job and user priorities will  be
left  at  the  Condor  supplied  default  values  or
very slightly adjusted.  The START expression
for  the execute nodes will almost certainly be
adjusted so that jobs start immediately (although
this  may  vary  depending  on  the  activity  of
interactive users in that area of the PWF).  This
situation  will  be  kept  under  review  and  may
well change depending on the usage pattern of
this Condor pool and of interactive usage of the
machines by users.
As well  adding  the  different  OS platforms
on the execute nodes to  the pool  in  a  phased
manner, ‘official’ support for Condor’s different
universes  will  also  be  added  in  a  phased
manner.   Note that,  with  the exception of  the
PVM universe  (where  it  is  envisaged that  the
relevant module will not be installed), little or
no  attempt  will  be  made  to  prevent  users
running jobs in a particular universe – ‘official’
support  for  a  universe  merely  indicates  that
users can expect support for running jobs under
that universe from the relevant UCS members
of staff.
Initially  the vanilla  universe,  and  probably
the Java universe will be ‘officially’ supported.
‘Official’  support  will  then  be  added  for  the
standard universe.  It is very unlikely that there
will ever be ‘official’ support for the Globus or
PVM universes, or for user jobs which attempt
to use the scheduler universe directly, although
the  use  of  DAGMan  will  be  eventually
‘officially’  supported.   It  is  also  unlikely  that
there  will  be  ‘official’  support  for  the  MPI
universe  –  such  support  would  require  a
Condor-supported implementation of MPI to be
installed on the execute nodes, and this would
be a non-trivial process for PWF Linux.
Note that these decisions, as indeed are most
of  the  decisions  concerning  this  environment,
are dictated by a combination of end-user and
stakeholder  requirements,  resource  constraints
and best practice.  As these change, so too will
the relevant policies and implementation details
of  this  environment  –  in  particular,  the  UCS
seeks to provide a service that is responsive to
the  reasonable  requirements  of  its  users  and
potential users, and as new or changed end-user
requirements are made known to the UCS the
service provided will adapt accordingly.
2.2 Environment 2
The   second   environment   comprises   all   other
machines   belonging   to   participating
Departments and Colleges.   These may or may
not be operating behind firewalls,  and may or
may   not   be   using   private   IP   addresses.
Potentially,   machines   in   any   participating
institution   may   need   to   communicate   with
machines in any other.    This “many­to­many”
communication model potentially conflicts with
efforts to establish network choke­points in the
form   of   firewalls,   whose   design   tends   to   be
aimed at  an asymmetric  “one­to­many;  many­
to­one” model  of   interaction between network
hosts.  Unless the benefits of firewalls are to be
sacrificed   or   the   cost   of  maintaining   firewall
rulesets is to rise with the number of machines
protected, the second environment must channel
inter­machine communications in such a way as
most closely to resemble the model encouraged
by   the   firewalls   involved.     Communications
may be switched at the application, connection
or network level.
The Condor project is currently developing
extensions   to   the  middleware   [3]   in   order   to
facilitate   the   inclusion   of   such   resources   –
Dynamic Port  Forwarding  (DPF) and Generic
Connection  Brokering   (GCB)  –  but   these  are
not yet ready to be deployed in a stable release.
Hence,   we   have   implemented   our   own
experimental   solution   external   to   Condor   –
specifically,  we   have   constructed   a   dedicated
Virtual Private Network (VPN) based on secnet
[4],   which   is   freely   downloadable   and
developed within the Department of Computer
Science  at   the  University  of  Cambridge.    All
participating machines are given an (additional)
IP address in this VPN.  The aim was to deduce
how effective   such   a   solution  would   be,   and
whether   it   was   a   feasible   production
environment once security considerations were
taken into account. 
This approach greatly simplifies negotiating
firewalls, since now only a single machine (the
VPN   gateway)   from   a   firewalled   institution
needs to have external access, and then only via
a single UDP port for a relatively small number
of  machines   (the   other  VPN  gateways).    All
other machines belonging to that institution now
tunnel   their   ‘Condor   traffic’   through   that
gateway,   regardless   of   whether   they   have
private  IP  addresses.    An added  bonus  is   that
traffic   between   different   gateways   is
automatically   encrypted,   adding   a   layer   of
security to the model.  However, running such a
VPN   raises   its   own   security   issues,   since
institutional   firewalls   are   effectively   bypassed
by this mechanism, so extreme care needs to be
taken both in administering the gateway and in
formulating  an  appropriate   security  model   for
this environment.
In Environment 2,  each institution runs its
own Condor  pool,  which  is   then  flocked with
any   number   of   the   other   pools   in   the
environment.     The  VPN gateway   can   be   the
central manager for that pool, but this is not a
requirement.  Policy as to how to administer and
trouble­shoot this cross­institutional resource is
non­trivial,   and   is   generally   developed   in
regular stakeholder meetings.   Our intention is
that once DPF becomes standard within Condor
it will replace the VPN solution, and will make
further   integration  with   the  UCS environment
more likely.
Figure   1   shows   the   architecture   of   our
Environment  2   test   bed.    There   are   currently
three participating departments, each of which
contributes   a   small   Condor   pool   (Condor
versions 6.6.3 and 6.6.4) consisting of a Central
Manager   and   another   node   capable   of   both
submitting and servicing jobs.  The departments
are the Department of Earth Sciences (ES), the
National   Institute   for  Environmental   eScience
(NIEeS)   and   the   Cambridge   eScience   Centre
(CeSC): note that ES lies behind a departmental
firewall.    The boxes  in   the Figure  contain  (in
descending order) the host name, the host’s real
IP address, its VPN address and an indication of
whether  it’s a Central Manager  (CM) or VPN
gateway (GW).   Each gateway is configured as
a   secnet  gateway   [4],  which  creates   a   second
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Figure 1: Environment 2 test bed 
architecture
virtual   interface   for   that   machine   within   the
private   IP   range   dedicated   for   this   purpose:
172.24.116.0/24.    The   gateway   also   needs   to
support IP forwarding, e.g. on a Linux machine
one   needs   to   set   the   contents   of   /
proc/sys/net/ip4/ip_forward   to   1   and   load   the
TUN/TAP  module,   which   is   usually   already
resident  on  most  Linux  distributions  as   tun.o.
For  RedHat Linux  this   is  usually   located   in   /
lib/modules/<kernel #>/kernel/drivers/net. 
Leaf   nodes   on   the  VPN   do   not   run   any
special software, but simply have an additional
(virtual)   interface   added   (e.g.   using   ifconfig
under Linux) and a route added to their routing
table  to nominate the relevant gateway for  all
VPN traffic.  Hence note that in the figure, solid
lines indicate intradepartmental traffic between
leaf/leaf   and   leaf/gateway   nodes,   while   the
dashed   lines   indicate   interdepartmental   traffic
between   gateways.     The   latter   is   encrypted,
which is a feature of secnet. 
Each host on the VPN also has an additional
identity   within   a   new   domain,
grid.private.cam.ac.uk, which   is  recognised by
the DNS servers across the university.    Hence
each CM allows flocking from other machines
in   this   domain   by   setting   FLOCK_FROM =
grid.private.cam.ac.uk in the condor_config file.
A CM nominates which other pools it wants to
flock to by listing the other CMs in FLOCK_TO
in   the  order   it  wants   to   try   flocking   in.    For
Condor  to use the VPN one must also set  the
value   of   NETWORK_INTERFACE   in   the
condor_config file to point at the correct virtual
interface on that machine.   Hence, for cartman
this  would  be  172.24.116.193   (see  Figure  1).
Obviously   all   other   references   to   host   and
domain names within the Condor configuration
files   must   refer   to   entries   in   the
grid.private.cam.ac.uk domain.
3. Conclusions and future work
3.1 Environment 1
Environment 1 is still in the design and testing
phase,  and  additional  user  requirements
continues  to  be  gathered  and  stakeholder  and
user  feedback  continues  to  be  sought  for  this
Environment.  There are a number of technical
issues  that  still  need  to  be  addressed  in  the
development of Environment 2.  In addition the
deployment team for Environment 1 still have a
number  of  unresolved  security  concerns  with
the  Condor  middleware  which  they  are
currently actively investigating.
One of the most significant technical issues
is the requirement for a “strong” authentication
method  for  Condor  that  is  supported  under
Linux, Windows and Mac OS X.  It is thought
that  this  may  be  solved  by  the  addition  of
Kerberos  support  to  Condor  under  Windows
and Mac OS X, which members of the Condor
Team  currently  suggest  may  be  available  in
Condor  6.7.2.   Were  this  to  come  about,  a
decision would then have to be made whether to
wait  for  the  next  stable  release  of  Condor
(provisionally  due  around  May  2005)  or  to
deploy an experimental release of Condor in a
production environment.
As mentioned is Section 1, one of the key
design goals of CamGrid is that the separation
into  two  separate  environments  should  not
adversely affect the end-user – in particular, the
grid  should  be  presented to  the  end-user  as a
single  resource  with  which  they  then  interact.
Since  the  authentication  requirements  for
Environment  1  are  greater  than  those  for
Environment 2, it is probably most sensible to
require that the user satisfy those requirements
and then provide  a transparent mechanism for
the  user  to  submit  their  jobs  to  the  most
appropriate environment.
The infrastructure which will enable this will
be developed along the following lines.  A job
submission  tool,  camgrid_submit,  will  be
developed  (based  on  the  condor_submit
command).   camgrid_submit  will  run  on  a
submission  node  for  Environment  1  and  will
work out which is the best environment for the
user’s job based on the job’s requirements and
the  currently  available  resources  in  the  two
environments.  As it  will run on a submission
node for Environment 1 it will be easily able to
submit  a  job  to  the  Environment  1  when
necessary.
If the job submission nodes for Environment
1 are also submission nodes for the flock that
constitutes  Environment  2,  then
camgrid_submit  will  also  be  able  to  submit  a
job  to  Environment  2  when  necessary.   Job
results will be returned to the submission node
for  Environment  1  on  which  camgrid_submit
ran,  and  the  user  will  be  able  to  collect  their
job’s output as normal.
A web portal using HTTPS as its transport
mechanism will  also  be  developed  which  will
allow  users  to  easily  transfer  files  to  the
submission nodes for  Environment 1 and then
launch camgrid_submit remotely via the portal,
which  will  submit  the  job  to  the  appropriate
environment.   Upon completion of the job the
user will be able to retrieve their results via the
web portal.
There is also another possible benefit to this
development  of a centralised submission point
for  CamGrid,  which may resolve some of  the
problems faced by Environment 2 (as described
in Section 3.2).  By making use of a single job
submission node, or an extremely small number
of  job  submission  nodes,  the  requirement  for
“many-to-many”  communication  described  in
Section 2.2  is  reduced  to  a  “one-to-many” or
“few-to-many”  requirement.   Such  a  reduced
requirement  will  place  comparatively  little
administrative burden on firewall administrators
and so may well be acceptable.
In  addition  a  solution  to  the  problem  of
private IP addresses may also be possible.  All
private IP addresses in the University must be
behind firewalls, except for those that have been
designated  “CUDN-wide”  – the  CUDN is the
Cambridge  University  Data  Network,  i.e.  the
network  which  connects  the  separate  College
and Department networks in the University.
Therefore, one solution to the problem of IP
addresses  would  be  to  give  resources  with
private  IP addresses so  called CUDN-wide IP
addresses,  either  as additional  IP addresses as
described in Section 2.2 or as replacements for
their existing IP addresses.   This would allow
the  submission  nodes  of  Environment  1  to
communicate  with  such  machines,  and  those
machines  would  still  not  be  accessible  from
outside  the  University  (by  virtue  of  having
CUDN-wide private addresses) and access from
within elsewhere within the University could be
controlled  by  the  firewall  behind  which  the
machine must lie.
However there may be resource owners or
firewall  administrators  who  are  unhappy  with
this  solution,  and  so  it  is  still  under
investigation.
3.2 Environment 2
We   have   successfully   flocked   three   small
Condor pools across a Virtual Private Network.
The   VPN   enables   us   to   tunnel   through
departmental firewalls and encrypt traffic across
inter­departmental   links,   allowing   nodes  with
private IP addresses are able to join a Grid that
crosses  institutional  boundaries.     Jobs  migrate
seamlessly across the flocked Condor pools and
there   is   no   noticeable   degradation   in
performance   due   to   the   overhead   of   running
across the VPN.   We clearly need to stress­test
our work in at least three directions: enlarge the
size of each pool, increase the number of pools
and the number of submitted jobs.
Use   of   a   VPN   raises   its   own   security
concerns.   As mentioned previously, the secnet
gateways   effectively   bypass   any   firewall
present,   and   we   are   currently   investigating
methods   for  mitigating   this   potential   security
risk,  e.g.  by filtering  packets  on  the gateways
and   by   limiting   the   number   of   submit   nodes
within each department.   These issues have not
been fully resolved at the time of writing and
further   deployment   of   Environment   2   will
depend   on  whether   suitable   solutions   can   be
formulated to meet these concerns.
We   have   experimented   with   the   use   of
digital   user   certificates   for   Environment   2.
(Condor   permits   certificates   to   be   used   for
authentication   in   a   number   of   different
contexts.)   Setup   proved   non­trivial,   but
appeared   to   work   adequately   in   operation.
Certificates can also be employed internally in
the   communication   between   the   Condor
daemons.  These uses of digital certificates may
mitigate   the   potential   problems   of   untrusted
users  gaining  unauthorised   access   to   the   pool
via flocking, but at an increased administrative
cost   in   obtaining   and   distributing   certificates,
and may well also decrease the usability of the
grid   for   end­users.     Also,   this   certificate
mechanism is  not  supported  by Condor  under
Windows,   and   hence   cannot   be   seen   as   a
complete solution to these security concerns. 
Some of the resources within CamGrid may
be parts of other grids, provided the owners of
these resources consent to jobs originating from
grids   external   to   the   university,   e.g.   LHC
Computing Grid (LCG) and the  UK e­Science
Level 2 Grid, running on their resources.
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